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Abstract  
We analyze free-riding behavior by Finnish municipalities prior to municipal 
mergers. The merger process creates a temporary common pool problem, which 
arises because of a delay from the initial merger decision to the actual merger. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find large responses to free-riding 
incentives. Consistent with the “law of 1/n”, the stronger the free-riding incentive 
a municipality faced, the more it increased its per capita debt and used up its cash 
reserves. These funds were spent mostly on investment and current expenditures. 
The results are somewhat surprising because the mergers were agreed upon 
voluntarily.  
Key words: Common pool, difference-in-differences, free-riding, law of 1/n, 
municipality mergers 
JEL classification numbers: D72, H72, H73, H77  
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1. Introduction 
The size and number of local governments is a crucial policy decision from the 
point of view of the efficient provision of local public goods and services (e.g. 
Miceli 1993; Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Ellingsen 1998). In a number of 
countries, municipality mergers are seen as an effective way of realizing 
economies of scale and such reforms are widespread. Major municipal merger 
reforms have been implemented over time in a number of countries including 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland (Dafflon, 
2012; Hansen, 2012; Hinnerich, 2009; Reingewertz, 2012; Weese, 2013). 
However, a possible, and somewhat overlooked, cost of municipality mergers is 
that the merger process itself creates a temporary common pool problem among 
the municipalities that are about to merge. This problem arises because usually 
there is a delay (in our case at least one calendar year) from the merger decision 
to the actual merger. Within this window, a single merging municipality can 
make autonomous decisions and shift some of the costs of additional 
expenditures or investments to its merger partners by increasing debt or 
liquidating assets.  
These free-riding incentives are directly related to the “law of 1/n” as formalized 
by Weingast et al. (1981) in the case of multiple identical and geographically 
distinct jurisdictions.1 In their model, the total size of the common pool increases 
in the number of districts (n) that form the common pool, which is an appropriate 
description of the municipal merger case.2 Each jurisdiction can propose a project 
that is always passed (universalism) and funded through generalized taxation on 
all n jurisdictions. In this model, the tax burden for each municipality is 1/n. 
Weingast et al. (1981) show that, in this setting, inefficiency increases with n 
because a single jurisdiction receives all the benefits from its project while the 
costs are shared amongst all districts. Municipal mergers are a particularly clean 
case to test the original law of 1/n because each municipality can make 
autonomous decisions during the common pool period. One distinction is that, in 
the case of a merger, due to the different population sizes of each municipality, 
the incentives to free-ride (share of costs) are not directly related to the number 
of municipalities in the upcoming merger, but rather to the size of the 
participating municipalities relative to the size of the common pool. 
                                              
1 Baron and Ferejohn (1987 and 1989) extend this line of argumentation to situations where decision-
makers need to bargain over which projects are carried out. In this context, they show that the common 
pool creates incentives not only to increase spending in the decision-makers’ own jurisdiction, but also to 
restrain the spending in other jurisdictions. See also Knight (2008) for further results. 
2 Primo and Snyder (2008) present a model where the total population size of the common pool is fixed, 
and the size of each district diminishes as n increases. This model is better suited to analysis of common 
pool issues related to how many municipalities there are in a country, rather than to free-riding incentives 
in each municipal merger. 
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Previous research has found evidence of free-riding behavior when the merger 
process has been forced upon the municipalities by central government. 
Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2010) study Swedish municipality 
mergers in the 1950’s, the 60’s and the 70’s. Hinnerich (2009) finds that the 
smaller a merged municipality was compared to its merger partners in terms of 
population, the more the municipality increased its per capita debt prior to 
merging. Jordahl and Liang (2010), on the other hand, find that a merger as such 
(or the creation of a common pool) had an effect on debt accumulation, but the 
relative size of the merging municipalities did not seem to matter. The latter 
evidence is somewhat hard to reconcile with free-riding behavior as predicted by 
the law of 1/n.3  
More recently and concerning contemporary mergers, Hansen (2012) analyzed 
the Danish municipal merger reform of 2007. As in the Swedish case, the reform 
was implemented by central government, which set forth a minimum population 
size threshold for the municipalities. The decision on how to reach this minimum 
size, or with whom to merge, was left to the municipalities. The Danish case is 
interesting because the Danish central government foresaw the possibility of 
common pool problems and implemented a number of additional fiscal 
restrictions on the municipalities during the merger process. Most importantly, 
central government started to regulate local capital spending and practically froze 
the amount of local liquid assets (Blom-Hansen 2010). Because of these 
restrictions, Hansen (2012) analyzes current expenditures and budget overruns 
and concludes that clear free-riding took place. However, it is not clear why 
changes in these items can be seen as evidence in favor of free-riding. Free-riding 
takes place only if some of the costs of increased current expenditure can be 
shifted to the merger partners and Hansen (2012) does not report debt 
accumulation or changes in asset positions.  
The current state of the literature is such that the evidence of common pool 
problems related to municipality mergers is somewhat mixed, possibly due to 
issues in research design and whether a common pool was created in the first 
place.4 Furthermore, the evidence thus far concerns only forced municipal 
mergers. In this paper, we analyze free-riding behavior by Finnish municipalities 
during a recent wave of municipal mergers. Our institutional setup differs from 
the Swedish and Danish cases in an important way because the Finnish mergers 
                                              
3 This somewhat surprising result may be due to potential endogeneity issues in Jordahl and Liang (2010), 
because the common trends assumption does not hold in their case as regards the debt levels. Therefore, 
they resort to analyzing difference-in-differences of changes in debt.  
4 The common pool problem has been analyzed in a number of different contexts and the results from 
these papers are also somewhat mixed. For example, in the context of local government council size, 
Baqir (2002) finds that greater districting or more councilors in U.S. city councils leads to more spending. 
However, MacDonald (2008) extends Baqir’s data set to cover more years and finds no effects, while 
Petterson-Lidbom (2012) finds that increasing the number of councilors in Finnish and Swedish 
municipal councils actually leads to lower levels of municipal spending. 
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were decided voluntarily at the local level by municipality councils. It is unclear 
whether we should expect common pool problems to arise in this setting because 
one might expect that municipalities can somehow agree not to exploit the 
common pool or that extensive free-riding would result in a cancellation of the 
merger.  
Somewhat surprisingly, though, using difference-in-differences (DID) methods 
with a continuous treatment, we find large free-riding effects also among 
voluntary mergers. Consistent with the law of 1/n, the stronger free-riding 
incentive a municipality faced, the more it increased per capita debt and used up 
its cash reserves. Unlike the previous papers, we can also follow the money to a 
certain extent. We find that extra funds from the common pool were spent mostly 
on investment and on current expenditures. Municipalities did not lower their 
local income tax rate nor did they hire new employees. Overall, due to free-
riding, the merged municipalities accumulated about 250 million euros of debt, 
corresponding to roughly 20% of their pre-treatment debt stock, and also 
decreased their cash reserves substantially (140 million euros). 
Why do we observe such behavior in voluntary mergers? First, a close 
examination of the merger agreements reveals that municipalities did foresee a 
possible common pool problem, at least to a certain extent. Most merger 
agreements included phrases such as “municipalities should behave responsibly 
in their economic decision-making prior to merging” or “major investment 
decisions should be made jointly”. However, the agreements do not include any 
contingency plans for possible breaches or what exactly would constitute a 
breach.5  
Second, it might be difficult for merger partners to observe the exact behavior of 
their future partners because of delays in accounting and official statistics 
production. Often the final financial statistics from the final pre-merger year are 
available only after the merger has already taken place. It should also be stressed 
that the merging municipalities truly stayed autonomous entities prior to the 
actual merger even when the merger was already agreed upon.  
Third, although the mergers were decided on voluntarily, central government was 
encouraging mergers via a generous merger subsidy scheme.6 In this sense, 
merging municipalities differ systematically from those that did not merge, 
which may confound our results. However, within a given merger the subsidy 
simply increased the size of the common pool, and thus should not affect the 
interpretation of our results. This is consistent with the fact that we can replicate 
                                              
5 We are unaware of any cases where a merger was cancelled after it was formally accepted by the 
municipal councils.  
6 The subsidies were paid to the merged municipalities in annual installments over a three year period 
after the mergers had taken place. Nevertheless, municipalities could spend the subsidy before the merger 
by accumulating debt. 
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our results using only merged municipalities in a DID analysis and that explicitly 
controlling for the amount of subsidy does not alter the results. Furthermore, our 
estimates suggest that the increases in debt and decreases in cash reserves were in 
total much larger than the overall amount of central government subsidies 
granted for mergers.  
Finally, local politicians in municipalities with strong free-riding incentives 
(typically small municipalities) faced relatively low re-election prospects in post-
merger elections and, according to Hyytinen, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013), 
they appeared to be aware of this fact. Furthermore, Saarimaa and Tukiainen 
(2013b) show that after a merger, councilors mainly gained votes from their old 
constituencies. This means that some councilors were lame ducks facing a term 
limit (e.g. Besley and Case 1995; Ferraz and Finan 2011), while others needed to 
please (mostly) their old voters to assure re-election. As suggested by Aidt and 
Shvets (2012), the common pool problems may be exacerbated because of re-
election concerns if voters reward politicians who are able to bring home the 
bacon.7  
An alternative explanation for free-riding in the context of voluntary mergers is 
Coasean-type transfers between merging municipalities (Coase 1960). This case 
arises when a merger increases the welfare of the merger partners as a whole, but 
decreases the welfare of some of the individual partners. If the benefits are large 
enough, the winners can in principle compensate the losers in order buy their 
approval for the merger. This explanation is, however, unlikely when we look 
more closely at municipalities with strong free-riding incentives that exploited 
the common pool. These municipalities are on average poorer than merging 
municipalities with a weaker free-riding incentive, and thus do not seem to be 
attractive partners. One would expect that any transfers would go in the other 
direction. Moreover, Acemoglu (2003) raises some issues as to why such 
Coasean bargaining is unlikely to occur in a political context. We also show that 
municipalities that were less keen to merge, proxied by the share of councilors 
who voted in favor of the merger, do not accumulate more debt relative to more 
keen municipalities, suggesting that we can safely rule out a major role for 
Coasean transfers.   
Naturally, the fact that the Finnish mergers were decided voluntarily raises issues 
of non-random selection that may bias our results.8 Reassuringly, we are able to 
show long common pre-treatment trends for the control and various treatment 
groups. We also show that potential changes in the financial situation coinciding 
                                              
7 Aidt and Shevts (2012) present theoretical and empirical results in which re-election concerns 
exacerbate the common pool problem. This link arises in their theoretical model because politicians differ 
in their ability to bring home the bacon and elections are an ex post selection device that voters use to oust 
politicians who are unable to deliver the goods.   
8 Forced mergers may also be subject to selection due to the behavior of central government politicians, 
for example. 
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with increases in per capita debt (taxable income, corporate tax revenue and 
central government grants) cannot explain our findings. The results are also 
robust to using alternative control groups, placebo tests and adding control 
variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a short 
overview of the institutional setting of Finland and especially the merger process. 
In Section 3, we describe the empirical approach. We describe our data and 
present the econometric results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The Finnish mergers 
Finland has a two-tier system of government consisting of central government 
and municipalities at the local level. On an international comparison, Finnish 
municipalities perform extensive tasks. In addition to the usual local public 
goods and services, municipalities are responsible for providing most social and 
health care services and primary and secondary education. This makes 
municipalities of considerable importance to the overall economy. The GDP 
share of municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 20 
percent of the total workforce.  
In addition to their extensive tasks, Finnish municipalities have extensive fiscal 
autonomy.9 Most importantly for our purposes, there are no restrictions on 
municipal use of debt. Moreover, interest rates do not depend on individual 
municipality conditions due to a joint liability scheme.10 Furthermore, central 
government does not enforce additional restrictions on merging municipalities. 
Municipalities fund their expenses mostly using own revenue sources. The most 
important sources are local taxes and operating revenues, such as fees. The most 
important tax instrument is the local income tax. The tax rate is flat and 
municipalities can set the level freely. The property tax is of much less 
importance and municipalities can set property tax rates only within limits set by 
central government. The corporate income tax is a state level tax, but 
municipalities receive a share of this tax revenue based on the profits and 
employment of firms within their borders. In 2012, local income tax accounted 
for an average of 46 percent of total revenue, while property and corporate taxes 
accounted for only 3 percent. 
There are clear regional tax base and cost disparities, which are offset by a 
central government grant system. The system is based on estimates of average 
costs and tax bases, so municipalities have very limited ability to influence the 
amount of grants that they receive. The grant system covers about 20 percent of 
total municipal revenues, but this share varies a great deal. The system covers 
more than 50 percent of all revenues for every fourth municipality.  
Due to an expected increase in municipal spending and disparities in revenue 
bases caused by an aging population, central government initiated a plan in 2005 
aimed at reforming the municipal revenue structure and more importantly making 
the production of statutory municipal services more efficient. The main tool for 
strengthening the operating environment of municipalities in the government 
plan was municipality mergers. A provisional law enacted in 2007 clearly states 
                                              
9 Under the constitution, Finnish municipalities are self-governing entities, which means that central 
government cannot assign new tasks to municipalities without passing legislation. 
10 This is organized through Municipality Finance Plc, a credit institution owned by the local government 
sector. 
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that municipalities should have strong enough revenue and labor force bases to 
cope with the production of statutory municipal services. Municipalities were 
allowed to decide voluntarily whether and with whom to merge. Following the 
law, there was 1 merger in 2008 and 32 in 2009, 4 in 2010 and 6 in 2011. The 
number of municipalities involved in a given merger ranged from 2 up to 10 
municipalities. 
The central government encouraged mergers by granting generous merger 
subsidies to merged municipalities. The subsidy amount depends on the 
populations of the pre-merger municipalities, the population of the resulting new 
municipality, the number of participating municipalities in the merger and the 
timing of the merger. Mergers in 2008 and 2009 received more subsidies than 
those in subsequent years, possibly explaining why most mergers took place in 
2009. On the one hand, once the merger has been agreed upon the merger 
subsidy simply increases the size of the common pool. On the other hand, the 
subsidies pose potential problems for our analysis. For example, it could be that 
merging municipalities simply spend the subsidy beforehand and we would 
mistakenly interpret this as free-riding behavior. The first issue is that all the 
merged municipalities receive subsidies, whereas the other municipalities do not. 
Clearly, a simple comparison of merged and not-merged municipalities could 
separate the merger effect from potential effects of the subsidy. However, in our 
empirical analysis, we can directly control for merging and rely on within-merger 
differences in free-riding incentives to identify our key results. The second issue 
is that the size of the subsidy to each merger is highly correlated with our free-
riding measure. To alleviate this concern we also control directly for the amount 
of subsidy in a given merger.  
In this paper, in order to have a clean DID setup with respect to treatment timing, 
we focus on the 32 mergers that came into effect at the start of 2009.11 The 
merger process is as follows. The process usually starts with unofficial 
discussions which may lead to an initial feasibility study that is conducted by an 
external consultant. Based on the consultant’s report, municipal boards make a 
merger proposal to the municipal councils.12 This proposal is voted on by the 
councils. If the proposed merger gains a majority in all the participating councils, 
                                              
11 Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013a) study the determinants of the 2007–2009 mergers at an aggregate 
merger level and find evidence of association of voter preferences for the location of services, local 
politics, previous cooperation and fiscal distress in one of the potential merger partner with the mergers. 
Hyytinen, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) study individual councilors’ voting behavior in connection 
with these mergers and find that politicians’ desire to avoid electoral competition is reflected in their 
decision-making. 
12 Municipal councils are the main seat of power in Finnish municipal decision-making. Finland has a 
proportional open-list election system. Currently, there are eight parties that dominate municipal politics, 
but some local lists are prevalent as well. Municipal elections are held every four years on simultaneous 
election dates. The councils that voted for the mergers under scrutiny were elected in October 2004. The 
elections in October 2008 already used the new post-merger municipal division, although the merger 
came to effect at the start of 2009.    
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the merger goes through. If not, it is cancelled and all the municipalities continue 
as they were. The mergers we analyze were decided mostly in 2006 and some in 
2007. This means that merging municipalities had up to 2 years (for all at least 
2008, and for most also 2007) to exploit the common pool. These two years are 
the treatment period in our DID analysis. Since some of the mergers were 
decided on in 2006, some of the free-riding could have taken place already 
during that control period year. We return to this issue in our robustness analysis. 
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3. Econometric framework  
Our identification strategy is based on the difference-in-differences (DID) 
method, where a control group of municipalities is compared to treated 
municipalities before and after a treatment has taken place. According to the law 
of 1/n, the free-riding incentive for a municipality should depend on its relative 
size with respect to its merger partners. In the context of municipality mergers, 
municipality i with a population of popi in merger j with a total population of 
popj internalizes only popi/popj of the total marginal costs of funds (Hinnerich 
2009).  
For municipality i in merger j we define the free-ride treatment variable as 
 
 1 .iij
j
popfreeride
pop
= −    (1) 
 
Population levels are as measured in 2007. The treatment intensity is high when a 
municipality is small compared to the merger as a whole. This happens when a 
municipality is part of a merger involving many municipalities and/or merges 
with a much larger partner. The treatment is equal to zero for municipalities that 
did not merge.  
We also estimate models where we include a simple dummy indicating whether a 
municipality decided to merge. The intuition is that the mere creation of a 
common pool, i.e. the merger decision, leads to free-riding regardless of relative 
size. Jordahl and Liang (2010) argue that this may be the case if municipalities 
have limited understanding of all the incentives at work or limited opportunity to 
exploit the common pool, for example if they can only launch a limited number 
of investment projects each year. In our case, directly controlling for the merger 
dummy also alleviates problems related to the merger subsidies. 
Since we have municipal-level panel data for multiple years we estimate the 
following type of models:  
 
 1 2
1 2
2007 2008
2007 2008 ,
it it i t
i t i t
i t i t it
y
merger d merger d
freeride d freeride d u
μ τ
δ δ
α α
′= + +
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +
x β
 (2) 
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where y is one of our outcomes of interest. The vector x includes time-varying 
control variables, μ  is a municipality fixed effect and τ  a year fixed effect. The 
key explanatory variables in this setup are the interaction terms including the 
merger dummy and the freeride measure. The dummy variables d2007 and 
d2008 indicate that the observation relates to 2007 or 2008, respectively. We 
allow the treatment effect to vary between the two treatment years, for three 
reasons: first, 2007 may be contaminated in the sense that some of the analyzed 
mergers were decided on only late that year and the municipalities may not have 
had time to respond in 2007. Second, exploiting the common pool by investing 
may require some preparation time and may be effective only in 2008. Third, it 
may be optimal to liquidate assets as late as possible because a certain level of 
cash reserves is needed to run the day-to-day operations of the municipality.  
Alternatively, we can use only the continuous treatment variable. In this case, the 
model can be written as 
 
 
1 22007 2008 .
it it i t
i t i t it
y
freeride d freeride d u
μ τ
γ γ
′= + +
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +
x β
 (3) 
 
Since the mergers in our data were decided voluntarily by the municipalities the 
treatments are not randomly assigned. The main concerns are that the 
unobservables or the outcomes have different trends. To alleviate these concerns 
we subject our results to a number of validity and robustness tests. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data 
In presenting our results, we will rely heavily on graphical evidence, but will also 
provide regression results to confirm that our findings are statistically significant. 
In the graphical analysis, we divide the municipalities into three groups. The first 
group consists of municipalities that did not merge. In addition, we divide the 
merged municipalities into two equally sized groups based on the freeride 
measure. We label the group of municipalities with an above-median value of 
freeride as the “strong incentive” group and the “weak incentive” group consists 
of the municipalities with a below-median value of freeride. The municipalities 
in the strong incentive group are typically small and/or are involved in mergers 
with more than two municipalities. Of course, this division is somewhat arbitrary 
and we will fully exploit the continuity of the treatment variable using regression 
analysis.  
We use three sets of variables in our empirical analysis. First, we test the free-
riding hypothesis using the municipality’s per capita debt stock and cash 
reserves. Increasing debt or decreasing liquid funds are the most obvious ways a 
municipality can shift the costs of current expenditures or investments to future 
merger partners. Second, we use control variables to capture any changes in a 
municipality’s fiscal situation that may coincide with the merger process. Third, 
we analyze how municipalities spend the possible extra funds.   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our key variables for the groups 
described above. Overall there were 32 municipal mergers involving 99 
municipalities. The number of municipalities in a given merger ranged from 2 up 
to 10 municipalities.  The numbers in Table 1 are for 2005, i.e. just before any of 
these municipalities had decided to merge. The municipalities in the strong 
incentive group are on average smaller and were involved in larger mergers both 
in terms of merger population and number of municipalities in the merger 
compared to the weak incentive group. In other respects, the groups are quite 
similar. The municipalities in the strong incentive group are slightly poorer than 
the weak incentive group in terms of income tax base (taxable income) and 
corporate tax revenue, but they receive slightly larger grants.  
We use operating margin as our measure of municipal expenditures (apart from 
investment expenditures). Operating margin is an accounting concept which 
measures annual expenditures net of operating revenue, such as fees. This means 
that the operating margin equals the revenue deficit that municipalities need to 
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fill from their own tax revenue and central government grants.13 Once you add 
these revenue sources, the resulting amount is available for investment and 
depreciation or write-offs. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for municipalities prior to merger decisions 
(in 2005). 
 
 
4.2 DID results 
Next we move on to our main results. Figure 1 presents the development of the 
per capita debt stock and cash reserves from 2000 to 2008, which is the last year 
the merged municipalities existed as independent entities, and therefore the last 
year that municipal level statistics are available for this group. The vertical red 
line highlights the beginning of the treatment period. Two observations stand out 
from the figure. First, both debt stock and cash reserves seem to have common 
trends in the different groups up to 2006 when most of the merger decisions were 
made, although the groups differ slightly in terms of cash reserves in 2000 and 
2001. Second, group differences emerge in both outcomes after 2006. The debt 
stock increases much faster in the strong incentive group compared to both the 
weak incentive and the no-merger group. The weak incentive group also clearly 
differs from the no-merger group. A similar story is true for cash reserves. 
Municipalities in both the weak and strong incentive groups use up their cash 
reserves compared to the control group, although the strong incentive group 
                                              
13 Operating margin is the correct measure also because some municipalities produce or sell services to 
other municipalities. These services show up on the municipality’s expenditure side, but they also receive 
operating revenue from the sale of these services that we need to net-out. 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of observations
Population 12,732 40,029 19,298 23,807 3,455 3,316
Merger population 12,732 40,029 32,434 32,702 44,992 30,111
Merger size (number of municipalities) 1 1 3.06 1.52 4.94 2.74
Merger subsidy (€ per capita) 0 0 381.2 267.0 326.1 180.9
Freeride 0 0 0.43 0.25 0.91 0.05
Debt stock (€ per capita) 1,406 886 1,347 1,102 1,097 894
Cash reserves (€ per capita) 500.7 646.5 496.1 641.8 418.8 586.4
Taxable income (€ per capita) 10,226 2,148 11,368 1,796 10,085 1,443
Corporate income tax (€ per capita) 163.9 96.9 192.7 245.3 138.1 81.8
Central government grants (€ per capita) 1,553 572.0 1,222 566.3 1,404 472.5
Municipal tax rate (%) 18.68 0.64 18.55 0.85 18.69 0.68
Operating margin (€ per capita) -3,718 427.4 -3,580 417.9 -3,609 404.7
Municipal employees (per capita) 0.060 0.014 0.054 0.013 0.052 0.015
Investment expenses (€ capita) 440.7 363.4 467.2 291.9 487.9 586.7
306 49
No merger Weak incentives Strong incentives
50
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clearly stands out. The evolution of group differences in these outcomes is 
consistent with free-riding behavior. 
Figure 1. Debt stock and cash reserves in different free-rider groups (€ per 
capita). 
 
 
Despite the fact that the groups had similar pre-treatment common trends, a 
merger decision could coincide with a worsening of municipal finances or 
population changes. This would mean that increases in per capita debt, for 
example, are not necessarily driven by free-riding incentives, but instead simply 
a reaction to simultaneous fiscal distress.  
To alleviate these concerns, in Figure 2 we present the development of per capita 
taxable income, per capita corporate income tax revenue and per capita grants. 
Together with service fees, these comprise all the relevant municipal income 
sources.14 Again, all these variables seem to have clear common pre-treatment 
trends and, more importantly, the trends or differences in trends do not change 
during the treatment period. This gives us confidence that the observed increases 
in debt and decreases in cash reserves are not driven by group-specific changes in 
fiscal conditions. We also show the development of population levels in different 
groups to show that the merger decisions did not cause any sorting responses 
from citizens. 
  
                                              
14 Reliable data on itemized service fees are not available, partly because many of the service fees are 
channeled through various municipal cooperation organizations and the related accounting practices vary 
across municipalities. 
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Figure 2. Income tax base, corporate tax revenue, grants and population in 
different free-rider groups (monetary amounts in per capita terms).  
 
 
In Table 2, we report DID results based on Eq. (2) and (3). For each model 
specification and outcome, we report results both with and without control 
variables (see Figure 2). We first subject the merger dummy and freeride to a 
horserace and report the results for models where we include both the merger 
dummy and the freeride variable. It is evident from the results that the merger 
dummy is not statistically significant and that free-riding behavior is tightly 
connected to free-riding incentives, as predicted by the law of 1/n. In Panel A, 
the results for cash reserves are not very precise, but this is likely to be due to 
multicollinearity between the merger dummy and the freeride variable. As can be 
seen from Panel B, once we omit the merger dummy the cash reserves results are 
also highly statistically significant. Adding control variables has very little effect 
on the point estimates, which is, of course, what one would expect from Figure 2.  
Increasing the freeride variable from zero to one increases (decreases) the per 
capita municipal debt stock (cash reserves) on average by 570 (330) euros by the 
end of 2008. These are substantial amounts compared to the starting level of 
these variables. Overall, due to free-riding, the merged municipalities 
accumulated about 250 million euros more debt, corresponding to almost 20% of 
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their 2006 debt stock. The decrease in cash reserves is also substantial, roughly 
140 million euros.15  
Table 2.  DID results for debt stock and cash reserves. 
 
Finally, we are interested in how municipalities spend the extra money from the 
common pool. There are a number of ways in which municipalities can spend the 
money that benefit local taxpayers only. First, municipalities can lower either 
their municipal tax rates or service fees and fund the normal level of municipal 
expenditures using debt and liquid assets. Second, municipalities can increase 
                                              
15 These estimates are based on the point estimates from the models in Table 2 with the control variables, 
but without the discrete treatment. The calculation takes account of the fact that the effects are larger in 
smaller municipalities and that these outcomes are stock variables.  
Debt stock Debt stock Cash reserves Cash reserves
constant 765.6*** 893.6** 517.5*** -795.2** 
[22.89] [380.1] [15.53] [369.09]   
merger* 2007 -88.2 -107.9 54.88 15.48
[109.1] [113.2] [105.0] [112.5]   
merger* 2008 -183.5 -213.5* 33.27 -4.280
[124.2] [127.3] [128.5] [134.1]   
freeride* 2007 293.8 303.7 -147.5 -93.63
[183.4] [186.9] [148.8] [155.4]   
freeride* 2008 807.4*** 821.6*** -395.6** -323.4*  
[224.2] [225.6] [177.8] [186.8]   
controls no yes no yes
N 3,634 3,634 3,717 3,717
R 2 0.42 0.43 0.02 0.05
Debt stock Debt stock Cash reserves Cash reserves
constant 765.6*** 925.4** 517.5*** -796.4** 
[22.90] [375.9] [15.53] [363.8]   
freeride* 2007 189.8* 176.1* -83.16 -75.46
[102.7] [102.3] [67.86] [66.83]   
freeride* 2008 591.4*** 569.7*** -356.6*** -328.4***
[132.2] [131.9] [80.37] [83.92]   
controls no yes no yes
N 3,634 3,634 3,717 3,717
R 2 0.42 0.43 0.02 0.05
Notes: All the models include year and municipality fixed effects. The control 
variables include taxable income, corporate income tax revenue, grants and 
population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in 
brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
Panel B: Continuous treatment
Panel A: Discrete and continuous treatment
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current spending. Third, municipalities can invest the money in local projects. An 
example would be an investment in local schools or other service facilities 
serving mostly or only local taxpayers also after the merger.  
Figure 3 shows trends in the municipal income tax rate, operating margin per 
capita, municipal employees per capita and total investment per capita. There is 
no change in the municipal income tax rate in the treatment period, but the 
municipalities in the strong incentive group do increase both expenditures (lower 
operating margin) and investments, although the former is slightly difficult to 
detect from the figure due to scale differences. Interestingly, the additional 
expenditure is not directed towards hiring more municipal employees. This result 
is consistent with free-riding behavior. Hiring new employees does not guarantee 
that the benefits remain in the old municipality because employees can be easily 
shuffled around after a merger. All these variables, except for investments, 
follow clean pre-treatment common trends. 
Figure 3. Tax rate, operating margin, municipal employees and investment 
expenses in different free-rider groups. 
 
 
Table 3 confirms that the effects in Figure 3 are also statistically significant. 
Increasing freeride from zero to one increases municipal expenditure flows on 
average by 70 euros per capita in 2007 and 160 euros in 2008. Investments 
increase by 315 euros per capita in 2008. Overall, due to free-riding, the merged 
municipalities spending increased about 100 million euros and invested about 
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140 million euros more. Therefore, while we can follow some of the money, 
increases in expenditures and investments only account for about half of what we 
observe in debt and cash changes.16  
Table 3. DID results for tax rate, operating margin, municipal employees 
and investment. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks  
The fact that the mergers in our data were not randomized raises the possibility of 
selection bias. To alleviate these concerns, we subject our results to a number of 
robustness and validity checks. We start by testing formally for the common pre-
trends assumption for our main outcomes of interest using placebo treatment 
                                              
16 Our asset data is not detailed enough to track all the money. In public discussion, there has been 
speculation that municipalities try to protect their assets e.g. by setting up foundations that can be used to 
distribute benefits to residents of the old municipality even after a merger. This type of asset conversion 
cannot be detected from our data. 
Tax rate Tax rate
Operating 
margin
Operating 
margin
constant 18.15*** 18.70*** -2794*** -2361***
[0.015] [0.217] [6.204] [112.0]
freeride* 2007 0.072 0.068 -54.62 -67.70**
[0.053] [0.053] [34.55] [32.33]
freeride* 2008 0.130* 0.128* -110.4** -156.4***
[0.067] [0.068] [51.98] [46.96]
controls no yes no yes
N 3,727 3,727 3,727 3,727
R 2 0.61 0.61 0.93 0.94
Municipal 
employees
Municipal 
employees Investment Investment
constant 0.058*** 0.038*** 404.1*** 588.2***
[0.000] [0.006] [15.43] [215.7]   
freeride* 2007 -0.0004 -0.0009 56.67 53.31
[0.001] [0.001] [70.72] [71.48]   
freeride* 2008 -0.001 -0.001 327.2*** 314.77***
[0.002] [0.002] [87.60] [89.05]   
controls no yes no yes
N 3,727 3,727 3,723 3,723
R 2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: All the models include year and municipality fixed effects. The control 
variables include taxable income, corporate income tax revenue, grants and 
population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in 
brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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periods. These results are reported in Table 4. To focus the analysis around the 
placebo treatments, we use only two control and two treatment period years. In 
each row, we report a parameter estimate for the freeride variable from a single 
regression, while varying the treatment period definition across rows. The 
placebo regressions largely confirm the common pre-trend assumption. This is 
not surprising given the trends we observe in Figure 1. The only concern is that 
some effects seem to take place already in 2006. As mentioned earlier, some 
mergers were decided already very early on in 2006 and we may be observing 
real free-riding effects already at the end of 2006.17 In the last rows of both 
panels, we also report the real treatment period result with this shorter panel to 
alleviate potential concerns of statistical inference as raised by Bertrand et al. 
(2004). 
We report the placebo regressions for the operating margin and investment 
results in Table A1 in the appendix. The results for the operating margin verify 
the common trends assumption. However, the results concerning investment 
decisions are more problematic because we observe some statistically significant 
placebo effects. Thus, the investment results should be addressed with more 
caution than our main results on debt and cash. 
  
                                              
17 One way to deal with the attenuation bias caused by contamination would be to compare the mergers 
based on the distance in time before and after each decision date instead of across years. However, the 
statistics are available on an annual basis only, and therefore the current approach is more attractive.  
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Table 4. Placebo treatments for debt stock and cash reserves. 
 
Second, we use an alternative control group, which might be more similar to the 
treatment group (the mergers). In Figure 4, we have divided the non-merged 
municipalities into those that never considered any particular merger seriously 
enough to vote on it and those that actually voted for a merger, but the merger 
did not subsequently take place. The pre-treatment trends in per capita cash 
reserves look similar, although there are differences in levels. The pre-treatment 
trends in per capita loan stock for the group that voted look more similar to those 
of the merger group. However, for both outcomes, only the merger group shows 
any response to the treatment. 
Analysis period Treatment Coeff. Std. Err.
2000–2003 freeride* 2002 -28.47 45.89
freeride* 2003 -57.39 64.11
2001–2004 freeride* 2003 -41.94 44.48
freeride* 2004 -122.6 76.62
2002–2005 freeride* 2004 -97.61* 57.47
freeride* 2005 -48.40 87.90
2003–2006 freeride* 2005 0.541 62.73
freeride* 2006 157.0 100.1
2004–2007 freeride* 2006 177.3** 76.03
freeride* 2007 248.1*** 91.64
2005–2008 freeride* 2007 138.4** 61.22
freeride* 2008 504.3*** 108.3
2000–2003 freeride* 2002 -41.99 76.73
freeride* 2003 -42.26 74.94
2001–2004 freeride* 2003 -22.47 48.64
freeride* 2004 -87.52* 48.81
2002–2005 freeride* 2004 -58.39* 34.43
freeride* 2005 -55.62 39.19
2003–2006 freeride* 2005 -15.04 32.95
freeride* 2006 10.79 43.75
2004–2007 freeride* 2006 33.97 41.14
freeride* 2007 -26.64 74.83
2005–2008 freeride* 2007 -50.87 69.88
freeride* 2008 -286.9*** 83.17
Panel A: Debt stock
Panel B: Cash reserves
Notes: All the models in the table use four years of data with two control period 
years and two treatment period years. The models include the following control 
variables:  taxable income, corporate income tax revenue, grants and population. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Figure 4.  Debt stock and cash reserves in two different non-merger groups 
compared to all mergers (€ per capita). 
 
 
Third, we repeat our main analysis using only those municipalities that merged. 
These results are reported in columns (1) and (8) of Table 5. The results are 
qualitatively robust. Moreover, the results are almost identical to those in panel A 
of Table 2, as expected. These results are therefore valid within the merger 
sample and cannot be driven by sample selection issues related to the merger 
decision. 
In addition, there has been some discussion in the literature on whether freeride 
is the relevant measure when it comes to free-ride incentives in merger situations. 
For example, Hansen (2012) uses the number of municipalities in a merger as a 
measure of free-ride incentives. He argues that the relevant measure of free-
riding incentives is the number of decision-makers, which in our case is the 
number of municipalities, not the relative population sizes of municipalities. This 
is also what the result of Weingast et al. (1981) is indeed about. However, the 
law of 1/n arises because the districts in their model are of equal size, and thus 
the share of the cost burden for each district follows the law of 1/n. When 
districts or, in our case, municipalities are asymmetric in size within a merger, 
free-riding incentives, i.e. the share of cost burden, depend on the relative size of 
the municipalities. Nevertheless, we subject these two measures to a horserace in 
Table 5.18 Even though the measures are highly correlated, it becomes evident 
from columns (2), (5), (9) and (12) that the municipalities respond to the 
common pool according to their relative size rather than according to the number 
of partners.  
An independent reason to control for the number of municipalities is that 
municipalities that stand to lose most of their political representation in the post-
merger council may want to spend as much as possible when they can still make 
autonomous spending decisions. This is because in the post-merger council 
                                              
18 All the models in Table 5 are estimated only for the subsample of merged municipalities. 
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
D
eb
t s
to
ck
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Not voted Merger Voted
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
C
as
h 
ba
la
nc
e
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Not voted Merger Voted
 21 
 
bargaining considerations, in the spirit of Baron and Ferejohn (1987) and (1989), 
start to play a role. Expectations over the relative political power of a pre-merger 
municipality in the post-merger council are actually increasing in the number of 
municipalities for a given value of freeride.19 Thus debt accumulation may 
actually decrease with the number of municipalities in a merger for a given value 
of freeride. Therefore, the results in Table 5 also suggest that expectations over 
the distribution of post-merger political power do not seem to be a relevant 
consideration during the pre-merger phase. 
Another potential confounder is the merger subsidy. The amount of the subsidy 
depends on the populations of the pre-merger municipalities, the population of 
the new municipality and the number of municipalities in the merger. This means 
that the subsidy amount is correlated with our free-riding measure. Our concern 
is that municipalities may simply respond to an increase in future income and not 
to the free-riding incentives, which may create a spurious correlation between our 
key outcomes and the freeride measure. Based on columns (3), (6), (10) and (13) 
of Table 5, we can overrule this alternative explanation because controlling for 
the amount of subsidy does not change the point estimates of freeride. However, 
we cannot entirely rule out that the subsidy may play an independent role in 
decreasing cash reserves. It should also be pointed out that the total amount of 
subsidies paid to these mergers (217 million euros) was only about half of the 
total free-riding we observe.  
Finally, an alternative explanation for free-riding among voluntary mergers is 
Coasean transfers between the merging municipalities. However, this explanation 
does not seem plausible because the municipalities with strong free-riding are on 
average poorer than merging municipalities with a weaker free-riding incentive, 
and thus do not seem to be attractive partners. In addition, we tested whether 
municipalities that were reluctant to merge accumulate more debt. We measured 
this reluctance using the vote share in favor of the merger in the municipality 
council merger votes. The vote share does not have a direct effect on debt or cash 
(columns (4) and (11)) and controlling for it does not change the results 
concerning free-riding behavior (columns (7) and (14)). Of course, it is extremely 
difficult to completely rule out transfers with the available data. 
  
                                              
19 In proportional elections, from the point of view of a small municipality, a merger with a single much 
larger partner and a merger with two municipalities of roughly the same size can be very similar in terms 
of population shares or freeride. However, these mergers can be different when it comes to post-merger 
political power. Proposal power, coalition formation and bargaining possibilities are very different when 
councilors from a small pre-merger municipality negotiate with two municipalities of a similar size 
compared to one much larger municipality. 
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Table 5. Within-merger group results and test for alternative explanations. 
 
Panel A: Debt stock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
freeride* 2007 292.7 286.6 261.96 305.2
[184.9] [224.0] [188.4] [187.2]   
freeride* 2008 806.4*** 712.8** 769.9*** 800.6***
[226.0] [277.6] [229.8] [228.2]   
coalition size* 2007 16.57 1.982                
[22.95] [27.65]                
coalition size* 2008 67.07** 29.67                
[31.60] [36.51]                
subsidy* 2007 0.424 0.393                
[0.361] [0.361]                
subsidy* 2008 0.574 0.477                
[0.432] [0.427]                
voteshare* 2007 134.7 160.0
[187.3] [185.8]   
voteshare* 2008 -140.9 -77.71
[295.4] [286.7]   
N 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
R 2 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.46
Panel B: Cash reserves (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
freeride* 2007 -166.6 -119.1 -161.755 -168.8
[166.0] [170.8] [160.317] [170.2]   
freeride* 2008 -409.3** -360.8 -386.902** -420.5** 
[197.2] [228.9] [192.828] [198.1]   
coalition size* 2007 -19.30 -14.16                 
[13.471] [12.75]                 
coalition size* 2008 -32.01 -14.39                 
[19.28] [23.21]                 
subsidy* 2007 -0.200 -0.193                 
[0.209] [0.202]                 
subsidy* 2008 -0.494** -0.464**                 
[0.192] [0.185]                 
voteshare* 2007 -10.58 -22.16
[129.53] [133.9]   
voteshare* 2008 -149.7 -177.0
[150.5] [151.9]   
N 890 890 890 890 890 890 890
R 2 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
Notes: All the models include year and municipality fixed effects. All the models include the 
following control variables:  taxable income, corporate income tax revenue, grants and 
population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze free-riding behavior by Finnish municipalities during a 
recent wave of municipal mergers. Using DID methods, we find large free-riding 
effects. Consistent with the law of 1/n, the stronger free-riding incentive a 
municipality faced, the more it increased per capita debt and used up its cash 
reserves prior to merging. We also find that the funds were spent mostly on new 
investment and on current expenditures. Municipalities did not lower their local 
income tax rate nor did they hire new employees. 
The results are somewhat surprising because these mergers were decided on 
voluntarily at the local level by municipality councils. In would seem plausible 
that municipalities could pre-empt free-riding in their merger agreements or that 
free-riding would lead to the cancellation of the merger. However, this does not 
seem to be the case. Although the contents of the formal merger agreements 
suggest that municipalities were anticipating these issues, they seem to have had 
only limited ability to observe and contract upon free-riding.  
These results show that free-riding is a concern not only in forced (see e.g. 
Hinnerich 2009), but also in voluntary mergers. Naturally the severity of this 
problem depends on the institutional details and especially on the extent of fiscal 
autonomy of local governments. Free-riding is also likely to depend on the time 
lag between the decision and the actual implementation of a merger. Nonetheless, 
our results should be of wider interest, because common pool problems are 
present in many other contexts, such as in bail-outs of (local) governments.  
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Appendix. Additional results 
Table A1. Placebo treatments for operating margin and investment. 
 
 
Analysis period Treatment Coeff. Std. Err.
2000–2003 freeride* 2002 13.74 15.40
freeride* 2003 0.829 19.38
2001–2004 freeride* 2003 -6.724 17.41
freeride* 2004 -2.629 21.75
2002–2005 freeride* 2004 -0.121 17.89
freeride* 2005 5.998 27.58
2003–2006 freeride* 2005 8.899 23.55
freeride* 2006 -27.58 27.16
2004–2007 freeride* 2006 -32.98 22.49
freeride* 2007 -69.59** 34.57
2005–2008 freeride* 2007 -53.28* 31.42
freeride* 2008 -135.9*** 45.95
2000–2003 freeride* 2002 73.35 74.09
freeride* 2003 -49.04 48.38
2001–2004 freeride* 2003 -75.17 45.95
freeride* 2004 -64.31 57.16
2002–2005 freeride* 2004 -41.26 58.32
freeride* 2005 119.9* 64.60
2003–2006 freeride* 2005 174.8** 69.52
freeride* 2006 227.5*** 78.43
2004–2007 freeride* 2006 128.9* 77.95
freeride* 2007 25.00 89.16
2005–2008 freeride* 2007 -62.57 78.62
freeride* 2008 213.1** 97.59
Panel A: Operating margin
Panel B: Investment
Notes: All the models in the table use four years of data with two control period 
years and two treatment period years. The models include the following control 
variables:  taxable income, corporate income tax revenue, grants and population. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
